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Abstract
This article argues that Aristotle is 
a major influence in Zambrano’s 
works, and that several of the key 
concepts in her thinking can be ex-
plained by reading them in relation 
to Aristotle. Aristotle is the most 
quoted author after Ortega in Zam-
brano’s unpublished manuscripts, 
and he is continuously mentioned 
throughout her works. Even so, 
there have been few attempts at 
a comprehensive reading of the 
presence of Aristotle in Zambrano’s 
works. This article aims to initiate 
the discussion on what Zambrano 
used Aristotle for, and what the 
presence of Aristotelian concepts 
means for the interpretation of 
Zambrano’s philosophy. It is argued 
in the article that Zambrano uses 
Aristotle for the conception of a 
metaphysical structure of life and 
the human being. The article will 
show how Zambrano uses Aristot-
le’s concept of the soul (alma in 
Spanish, sometimes translated as 
mind in English versions of Aristot-
le) and of place (lugar in Spanish) 
in order to discuss the ontological 
and metaphysical grounds for hu-
man subjectivity.
Keywords
Aristotle, soul, place, mind, phy-
sics, transcendence
Resumen
El presente artículo propone que 
Aristóteles es una de las influencias 
importantes en la obra de Zambra-
no, y que varios de los conceptos 
clave en su pensamiento se pueden 
explicar mediante una lectura que 
toma como referencia al autor 
griego. Aristóteles es el pensador 
más citado, aparte de Ortega, en 
sus manuscritos, y, además, se 
menciona continuadamente en su 
obra publicada. El artículo intenta 
iniciar una discusión sobre cómo 
usa la pensadora a Aristóteles 
y cómo podrían contribuir sus 
conceptos en la interpretación de la 
obra zambraniana. Un argumento 
expuesto en el artículo mantiene 
que Zambrano utiliza a Aristóteles 
para una concepción de una estruc-
tura metafísica de la vida y del ser 
humano. El artículo muestra cómo 
la malagueña desarrolla el concepto 
del alma (frecuentemente traduci-
do al inglés con el término «mind») 
y del lugar para discutir el funda-
mento ontológico y metafísico de 
la subjetividad humana. 
Palabras clave
Aristóteles, alma, lugar, mind, 
física, transcendencia.
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Introduction
Which authors, if any, were influential in the development of 
Zambrano’s poetic thinking is a topic under constant debate. 
Spinoza, and also Nietzsche and Heidegger, are among the authors 
that are often used to interpret Zambrano’s writings.1 Aristotle is 
sometimes mentioned, for example, both Agustín Andreu and Jesús 
Moreno Sanz make longer interpretations of Aristotle in relation to 
Zambrano,2 but most often it is the abovementioned authors that 
are held to be key influences for understanding her philosophy. 
However, and ultimately what are considered key contexts to a 
philosopher has as much to do with the interpreter as with the 
object of interpretation, there are nevertheless good arguments for 
emphasising the relationship between Zambrano’s thinking and the 
works of Aristotle. One important such argument is the fact that 
Aristotle is mentioned in nearly all of Zambrano’s published works. 
And Aristotle is, in addition, besides Ortega the most cited author 
in her unpublished manuscripts.3 
It is possible to argue that given how Zambrano uses author cita-
tions in her texts, sometimes quoting without giving reference, and 
often enough excluding any mention of both texts and authors 
while clearly using ideas or even concepts from other authors, that 
this would lessen the value of the authors that she does mention. 
This argument falls back upon a specific understanding of Zambra-
no as non-systematic and as developing a symbolic, metaphoric and 
creative poetic reason. From this perspective, citation of authors 
should be not necessary and sometimes even counterproductive. It is 
the case however, that Zambrano does sometimes cite, as one of the 
many tools that she uses to convey meaning. It is obvious that 
Zambrano did not strive for clarity in the manner of a philosophical 
or scientific treatise,4 but she did sometimes use references in order 
to say something that contributed to the overall meaning in her 
writings. Zambrano writes something significative concerning the 
relationship between thought and tradition, in El hombre y lo divino: 
“Todos los vencidos son plagiados, en el sentido amplia de la palabra 
‘plagio’, que puede llegar a ser hasta el desenvolvimiento, el desarro-
llo de un tema inicial; hasta el rapto de una figura representativa. La 
suerte del razón del vencido es convertirse en semilla que germina en 
la tierra del vencedor.”5 Zambrano writes this precisely in relation to 
the way in which the thought of Aristotle takes up and uses the idea 
of the soul that she holds to stem from the Pythagoreans. But, it 
could also be understood to say something about the way in which 
Zambrano uses representative figures, and even other author’s 
names, to develop her own ideas. 
Particular authors often play the role of a symbol in Zambrano’s 
texts, conveying the meaning of an entire system of thought. This is, 
for example, the case in Zambrano’s Filosofía y poesía, were Plato is 
given the position of a symbol of philosophical idealism.6 By narrat-
1. On Nietzsche see, Maillard García, M. L., 
El Nietzsche de Zambrano, Madrid, Trotta, 
2012; Bundgård, A., “Nietzsche y María 
Zambrano: nihilismo y creación”, in Aurora, 
2009:10, pp. 19-28; Mayos Solosona, G., 
“Zambrano y Nietzsche, camino al 
language”, in Aurora, 2009:10, pp. 56-68; 
Eguizábal, J.I., El exilio y el reino en torno a 
María Zambrano, Madrid, Huerga y Fierros, 
2002. On Heidegger see, Zamboni, Ch., 
“Heidegger y Zambrano, dos formas 
diferentes de amor a la Naturaleza”, in 
Aurora, 2011:12, pp. 74-82; Acevedo Guerra, 
J., “La razón poetica, una aproximación 
(Zambrano y Heidegger)” in Aurora, 2008:9, 
pp. 6-14. On both authors see, Moreno Sanz, 
J., El logos oscuro: tragedia, mística y filosofía 
en María Zambrano, Madrid, Verbum, 2008.
2. Andreu, A., El Dios de su alma, Granada, 
Comares, 2007; Moreno Sanz, J., El Logos 
Oscuro, tragedia, mística y filosofía en María 
Zambrano, Madrid, Verbum, 2008.
3. Fenoy Gutiérrez, S., La obra inédita de 
María Zambrano, Barcelona, Balmes, 2008, 
p. 188.
4. See for example, Zambrano, M., Cartas de 
la Pièce – correspondencia con Agustín Andreu, 
Agustín Andreu (ed.), Valencia, Pre-textos, 
2002.
5. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino, in 
Obras Completas III, Barcelona, Galaxia 
Gutenberg, 2011, p. 153; “All vanquished are 
plagiarised, in the ample sense of ‘plagiarism’ 
that can come to be the very unfolding, the 
development, of an initial theme; even  
the rapture of a representative figure. The 
vanquished’s reason is lucky when converted 
into the seed that germinates in the soil of 
the victor.”
6. Zambrano, M., Filosofía y poesía, in Obras 
Completas, I, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 
2015, pp. 687-697.
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ing the history of thought in such a manner as to radically distin-
guish between two forms or modes of thinking — philosophy and 
poetry — and by positioning Plato as the origin of that separation, 
Zambrano is free to use Plato as the symbol of the entire historic 
development of philosophical idealism. This is the reason why she, 
in Filosofía y poesía, can jump without blinking between Plato, 
Descartes, Fichte and Kant, as if the history of philosophical ideal-
ism somehow could be contained in these authors. The description 
of the separation between philosophy and poetry is an important 
part of a larger historic narrative that Zambrano repeatedly comes 
back to during her later writings, where she emphasises the forgot-
ten forms of reason excluded by rational thought. Referring to 
particular authors is one tool that Zambrano uses to make the sharp 
distinctions between forms of thought and for conveying specific 
descriptions of these forms. This is the case with Zambrano’s use of 
Aristotle too. 
Aristotelian concepts and figures in Zambrano’s texts
One way of reading Zambrano’s texts is thus to analyse which 
concepts, and figures, are connected to Aristotle, and in what discus-
sions they are given meaning. This way of reading may contribute to 
a better understanding of Zambrano’s philosophical project, as well 
as furthering our knowledge of Zambrano’s way of conceiving 
problems. In the following I will use the term ‘concept’ to denote 
actual Aristotelian concepts in Zambrano’s texts, and ‘figures’ to 
denote both symbols, structures and metaphors that can be inter-
preted to fit with Aristotelian philosophy.
A first example can be given. In a manuscript of uncertain date 
(M:-462: 0657) Zambrano writes in capitals: “la concepción 
entera aristotélica de la fysis y del motor inmovil traslada-
da al hombre.”7 The manuscript gives no further explanations of 
what this might mean, except for the fact that Zambrano connects 
the discussion on physis to that of time as she explains that in 
Aristotle time is a limit-concept that produces a horizon for every 
living being. This suggests that whereas fysis is an Aristotelian 
concept that Zambrano uses, her account of time could possibly be 
understood as a structure in Zambrano’s thinking directly influenced 
by Aristotle. Interestingly enough, and because horizon isn’t a very 
prominent concept in Aristotle’s writings, it is likely that Zambrano 
is making reference to a certain reading of Aristotle: the Heideggeri-
an interpretation in which the concept of horizon can be found. 
(Instead of horizon Aristotle uses ‘a body bounded by a surface’ in 
his Physics.8) 
As a second example, and in yet another significant manuscript, 
M-214, entitled “Los lugares de la poesía”, Zambrano writes about the 
concept of place, lugar, that it must be conceived of as a non-fixed 
room of events. The latter is a notion that she refers to Aristotle.9
7. Zambrano, M., M-462: 0657 in the 
archive of the Fundación María Zambrano: 
“the entire aristotelian conception of 
the physis and of the un-movable motor 
transferred to the human being.”
8. Aristotle, Physics, IV 4, 212a6-7 and III 5, 
204b5.
9. Zambrano, M., M-214. Also published in 
Algunos lugares de la poesía, Juan Fernando 
Ortega Muñoz (ed.), Trotta, Madrid, 2007.
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10. “That is to say: dunamis resides in the 
subconscious, and it demands energueia, it 
demands the act that actualizes it./ The 
physics of Aristotle serves to give an account 
of the subconscious, and not only when it 
comes to the vegetative soul — the dreams — 
but in the process of transformation of a 
living being from potency to the form, from 
being in potency to active being. A process 
that does not appear in that on the soul [sic.] 
which gives in a stratified manner the three 
planes of the soul, revealing and to a certain 
extent sacred.” Zambrano, M., De la Aurora, 
p. 147. Cursive in the original.
11. “Temporality, that field of the latent God, 
god understood here simply as potency. Time 
is the originary potency that actualizes being, 
without which it would be, yes, as if it wasn’t 
there, without any power. And without love, 
without the initial love that moves 
everything.” Zambrano, M., De la Aurora,  
p. 112.
It is clear from the manuscripts that Zambrano intended to use 
Aristotle’s physical conceptions in relationship to her own philo-
sophical project. In the first manuscript cited here, Zambrano 
indicates that she wants to transfer the Aristotelian concept of physis 
to the human being. This is a statement that she repeats later, in De 
la Aurora, where she also refers directly to Aristotle. Discussing a 
three-partite division of the human soul — consisting of inconsciente 
[unconscious], subconsciente [subconscious] and consciente [con-
sciousness] — Zambrano writes:
Es decir: que en el subconsciente reside la dynamis que clama por la 
energueia, por el acto que la actualice.| La física de Aristóteles sirve para 
dar cuenta del subconsciente, y no solo en lo que hace al alma vegetati-
va — los sueños — sino en el proceso de transformación del ser vivo 
desde la potencia a la forma, del ser en potencia al ser en acto. Proceso 
que no aparece en el tratado del alma [sic.] que da estratificadamente 
los [p]lanos del alma, la tríada reveladora y en cierto modo sacra.10 
Here, Zambrano uses the concepts dunamis and energeia in order to 
describe structures and functions of the human soul/mind. It can be 
noted that the concept that Aristotle uses, nous, [voūς] is translated 
as alma — i.e. soul — in the Spanish translations but as mind in the 
English translation of De anima, as well as in the Metaphysics. As we 
will see, this difference in translation is significant because it allows 
Zambrano to conceive of different agents or kinds of agency in the 
unity of human cognitive capacities. In the passage quoted here, 
concepts from Aristotle are used to distinguish between different 
kinds of human agency: firstly, a passive and vegetal state that 
Zambrano also draws from the description of different kinds of 
souls in Aristotle’s De Anima. And secondly, what can be conceived 
of as a function — dunamis and energeuia — that works to actualize 
the potential of the inconsciente into conscious form. 
It can be concluded from the citations above that Zambrano uses 
Aristotle to discuss physics in a broad sense, and more specifically 
conceptions of time and the totality of the human cognitive facul-
ties. In fact, in De la Aurora, Zambrano uses Aristotelian concepts to 
indicate a discussion on the human being and its place in the 
universe.
La temporalidad, ese campo del Dios latente, dios entendido aquí 
simplemente como potencia. El tiempo es la potencia originaria que 
actualiza el ser, que sin él sería sí, mas como si no fuse, sin poder 
alguno. Y sin amor, sin el amor primero que mueve toda cosa.11 
Time is the “field of the latent God”, says Zambrano, a God that 
needs to be understood only as potencia and that actualizes being. 
And furthermore, potency is equated with love, according to the 
quotation above. And Zambrano continues: 
16493_aurora_17_tripa.indd   23 17/11/16   11:06
24
au
ro
ra
 / 
n.
º 
17
 / 
20
16
The Presence of Aristotle in the Works of Maria Zambrano: Initial Readings
is
sn
: 1
57
5-
50
45
 / 
is
sn
-e
: 2
01
4-
91
07
 / 
do
i: 
10
.1
34
4/
Au
ro
ra
20
16
.1
7.
2
12. “Time as a pure heartbeat and space as a 
pure quality, which opens up without 
breaking away, like something that gathers 
without dispersing, that without unfolding 
goes on to signal innumerable directions; the 
real image of the universe, of the One from 
which all things and beings come, and  
from which they become separated when 
taking form.” Zambrano, M., De la Aurora, 
p. 112.
13. Sánchez-Gey Venegas, J., “Lo originario 
en el pensamineto religioso de María 
Zambrano”, in Aurora, 2005:7, pp. 78-83. 
Jesús Moreno Sanz calls the entire book “el 
colofón” of what Zambrano had written up 
until 1955. See, “Anejo a El hombre y lo 
divino”, in Zambrano, M., Obras Com - 
pletas III, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 
2011, p. 1173.
14. See, Moreno Sanz, ibid. pp. 1177-1178. 
Moreno Sanz makes reference to the 
manuscript M-171, in which Zambrano 
outlines a metaphysics parting from Aristotle. 
See also Andreu, A., María Zambrano, el dios 
de su alma, Granada, Comares, 2007.
El tiempo como un puro latido y el espacio como una pura cualidad, 
que se abre sin desprenderse, como algo que recoge y no que disper- 
 sa, que sin desplegarse va señalando innumerables direcciones; imagen 
real del universo, de ese Uno de donde todas las cosas y seres proceden, 
del que al tomar figura quedan separadas.12
Time is a pure heartbeat, and space is a pure quality, that “opens  
up without breaking away”, that without “unfolding” — sin desple-
garse — signals numerous directions. As becomes evident, Zambra-
no is using Aristotle to develop a conception of the universe that is 
one, in the sense of a common origin before the separation that 
occurs when things become figura. Interestingly enough, Zambrano 
gives primacy to time rather than space, and describes the latter as 
something that is contingent in relation to time. Zambrano is 
developing a time-space conception, conceived in direct relation to 
Aristotle. This is somewhat surprising seeing how Zambrano’s most 
famous impasse on Aristotle — the chapter “La condenación 
Aristotélica de los Pitagóricos” in El hombre y lo divino — seemingly 
condemns his cosmology in favour of a Pythagorean world-view. 
Aristotle in El hombre y lo divino
Aristotle is an important influence in Zambrano’s El hombre y lo 
divino, and most particularly so in the chapter “La condenación 
aristotélica de los Pitagóricos”. Concepts of Aristotle are present in 
other parts of the book too, as for example in the discussion on 
ruins, and of temples. In order to understand how Zambrano uses 
Aristotelian concepts in the latter two discussions, however, it is 
necessary to understand the critique or debate that she holds with 
Aristotle in the aforementioned chapter. The text has been under-
stood as a key text in Zambrano’s thinking and, for example, 
Sánchez-Gey Venegas uses it to enforce an interpretation of Zambra-
no’s thinking as beginning in a clear distinction between philosophy 
and poetry.13 However, and as both Moreno Sanz and Andreu have 
noted, the chapter should not only be considered a critique of 
Aristotle, but the beginning of a metaphysical project developing 
directly from Aristotle.14 Since the critique that Zambrano turns 
against Aristotle in this chapter, clearly is a critique of a way of 
conceiving the human being that reduces it to a rational being, it 
could be expected that the chapter would not only critique reason, 
but try to debate or synthesise poetry and reason, thinking and 
delirium. Nevertheless, the chapter hardly mentions poetry at all, 
and instead discusses time and different times as essential to this 
metaphysical project. She even goes so far as to suggest that the 
theory of relativity with its new time-space conception could be 
used to lay the grounds of a new metaphysics. When she does 
separate between different kinds of knowledge, she does so directly 
related to Aristotle. Interestingly enough, Aristotle is not only the 
point of departure of her critique but also the fountain from which 
she draws concepts to delineate other forms of knowledge. Zambra-
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15. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 146.
16. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
pp. 160, 162-163.
17. Aristotle, De Anima, 2:1, 412a20-21.
18. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 171.
19. Aristotle, De Anima, 3:4, 429a14 and 3:5, 
430a14-15.
20. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 171.
no criticises Aristotle’s notion of substance, and compares it to 
Plato’s ideas, as an entity of thought designed to securely found the 
worldly realm of appearances. Zambrano’s critique is thus directed 
toward a conception of the world that reduces appearances to 
entities with essential properties. Zambrano writes that with Aristot-
le’s concept of substance a clear-cut differentiation was introduced 
between the world, and the Gods, since only the un-moved mover 
was found to stand beyond the notions of substance. Zambrano 
thus suggests that from Aristotle, and in relation to the un-moved 
mover, a concept of unsubstantiated — insustanciales — being can 
be deduced.15 
The separation between two different kinds of realms, one of 
unsubstantiated beings and one of substantiated identity, is crucial 
for understanding Zambrano’s philosophical project, at least from 
the publication of El hombre y lo divino. This is a major structure 
that Zambrano will repeatedly represent in different figures in her 
late books. In the chapter on Aristotle and the Pythagoreans, 
Zambrano refers to the unsubstantiated realm as alma pura — ‘pure 
soul’ — and as un sentir originario y por tanto pasivo — ‘an originary 
sense perception and for that reason passive’.16 
So far we can conclude that there are two parts to Zambrano’s 
positive interpretation of Aristotle: on the one hand ideas about 
physics, and on the other ideas about the soul. These two parts of 
Zambrano’s Aristotelian interpretation could be treated as complete-
ly separate but, as Zambrano indicates in the quotation given above, 
she wants to use the Aristotelian concept of physics to understand 
the human being. This suggests that in fact questions of soul and of 
physics are intimately connected. Furthermore, both in De la Aurora 
and in El hombre y lo divino Aristotle is invoked as a means  
of discussing time. In the chapter under discussion here, Zambrano’s 
discussion on soul, matter and time is outlined beginning in the 
critique of parts of the Aristotelian conception of the soul. Zambra-
no suggests that by equating substance and soul — something 
Aristotle does in De Anima17 — the philosopher tried to reduce the 
human soul to an actively thinking substance.18 But, writes Zambra-
no, without being aware, Aristotle also reproduced some of the 
notions held by the Pythagoreans. She notes that the passive soul, as 
outlined in De Anima,19 is in fact close to a Pythagorean conception 
of the soul, and that it is connected to the passive sacred. Zambrano 
writes that while Aristotle, when conceiving of the active soul, tried 
to place time in the substance and thus tried to reduce it to one 
kind, he also opens up for time as multiple when he speaks of 
concepts such as potency and coming into being (devenir).20 
That Aristotle wanted to reduce time to one kind, must be consid-
ered an interpretation that can at least be contested since, as Zam-
brano herself shows, there seems to be two somewhat conflicting 
notions of time in his works. Zambrano suggests that in Aristotle 
16493_aurora_17_tripa.indd   25 17/11/16   11:06
26
au
ro
ra
 / 
n.
º 
17
 / 
20
16
The Presence of Aristotle in the Works of Maria Zambrano: Initial Readings
is
sn
: 1
57
5-
50
45
 / 
is
sn
-e
: 2
01
4-
91
07
 / 
do
i: 
10
.1
34
4/
Au
ro
ra
20
16
.1
7.
2
21. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12:3, 1069a-1076b. 
“Neither matter nor form comes into being.”
22. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 171.
23. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 171.
24. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5:11. For further 
arguments concerning time as number in 
Aristotle, see Ursula Coope, Time for 
Aristotle, Physics IV: 10-14. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2005.
25. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
p. 171.
time is always the time of a substance, i.e. time is the change that 
occurs when something comes into being according to its substance. 
Time is always given in concrete substances, according to Zambra-
no’s interpretation of Aristotle. And here, again, she quotes the 
Metaphysics, “ni la materia ni la forma devienen.”21 In this interpreta-
tion time is equal to the change that occurs in a substance.22 
But as Zambrano also notes, time is the concept that in Aristotle 
most resembles the Pythagorean world-view, since time can also be 
understood as a scale of numbers.23 This statement seems somewhat 
strange since a change in substance must be an essential change, 
given that Zambrano has interpreted substance to be similar to 
platonic ideas. But number is usually understood as measurement, 
i.e. as a designation or order given to things insofar as they are 
countable. If I want to know how many chairs there is in a room,  
I cannot answer that question by also including the tables in my 
account. (Even though, if I wanted to know how much furniture 
there is in a room, this could be answered by counting both chairs 
and tables and any other object that I designate as furniture.) In this 
sense for something to be countable means that it must be at the 
one time different from other things (this chair and not that chair), 
and at the same time similar (all chairs). If substance is interpreted 
to be that thing by which something is what it is, it seems problem-
atic to speak of time as both number and change in substance, since 
the notion of substance seems to exclude the condition of similarity 
pertaining to number. Another aspect of number, however, can help 
understand how Zambrano could combine the definition of time as 
both a change in substance and as number.
Number orders in a certain manner, and this is particularly true 
when it comes to time. If we were to look at the numerical series as 
such, any of its positions — for example, two, or five, or 365 — 
could not occur in any other place than where it does. Three is 
always more than two, and 366 always comes after 365. In this sense 
each number has its unique position. And when concerning time, it 
is because we separate entities in time — before, now and after are 
entities that could occur in no other order — that we can speak of 
time at all. This is at least the case in Aristotle’s account of time in 
the Metaphysics, where it is the measured distance between before, 
now and after that discloses what time is.24 And it seems to be this 
ordering of unique positions that Zambrano refers to when stating 
that in Aristotle time is both a change in substance and a number. 
Zambrano writes that in Aristotle time is the movement from 
non-being to being, and that the form of this movement is circular 
because non-being can only be conceived of after having become 
actualized.25 So, in Zambrano’s interpretation of Aristotle’s time-con-
cept, time is a circular shaped order that posits potentiality and 
actualization in a paradoxical relation to each other. According to 
Zambrano’s account it is impossible to speak of potentiality or 
non-being before a thing has become actualized into being. In 
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26. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino,  
pp. 211-213, 247.
27. This argument indicates that Zambrano 
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relation to what was said above of the un-moved mover, this sug-
gests that Zambrano’s notion of a kind of unsubstantiated realm 
referred to as the sacred, or as non-being or la nada — nothing-
ness,26 in fact stands in a mutually dependent relationship to being. 
That is, being could not be actualized without potency, whereas 
there could be no conception of origin or potency without a thing 
already actualized.27 
With this argument, Zambrano is in fact drawing attention to what 
can be conceived of as another discussion in Aristotle’s Physics 
concerning time, which connects time to the discussion of location. 
If the solution of how to conceive of time as both a change in 
substance and as a number is a time-conception that emphasises 
ordering of unique positions, then the conception that Zambrano is 
developing can be understood to include ideas about space too. At 
the end of the chapter discussed here, Zambrano suggests that, in 
fact, the puzzles that she has drawn out by counterpoising Aristotle 
and the Pythagoreans, could maybe be resolved within the new 
physics of relativity.28 Ultimately, what Zambrano develops, with the 
help of Aristotle, is a time-space concept closely connected to 
human subjectivity. 
Time-space and place as a changing surface
We have already seen that in the manuscript M-214 Zambrano 
discussed the place — el lugar — as an Aristotelian conception. In 
El hombre y lo divino, space is discussed through a series of spatial 
figures, such as, for example, the ruin and the temple. The latter is a 
good example of how Zambrano creates figures structured around 
Aristotelian concepts. 
El lugar sagrado originario ha encontrado su cumplida revelación. La 
potencia contenida en lo solamente sagrado se expande recorriendo 
todo el templo y sus contornos visibles, uniendo cielo y tierra con el 
mar, que se tornan enteramente visibles cada uno dentro de la unidad 
que los transciende, en un lugar que se diviniza humanizándose o se 
humaniza por divinarze.29
The quotation describes the temple as a space that is identified by it 
being the revelation of the sacred, and by being organized in space 
— “todo el templo y sus contornos visibles, uniendo cielo y tierra con el 
mar” (the entire temple and its visible surroundings, unifying 
heaven and earth with the ocean) — as a specific kind of location. 
Zambrano equates the sacred with potency, and distinguishes the 
revealed temple from the lugar sagrado originario — the originary 
sacred place. The temple as a place can thus be conceived of as the 
product in both time and space whereby something pertaining to 
the originary realm takes shape as something “completely visible”. 
Furthermore, the quotation describes the character of the temple as 
an object that is completely visible, stating that it is so by differenti-
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ation — temple and surroundings — within a unity that transcends 
everything. In a sense then, time and space, as described in Zambra-
no’s figure of the temple, cannot be thought the one without the 
other. Time-space is an ordering in number — here understood as a 
geometrical relationship — and as change in substance — when the 
temple comes into being as revelation from the sacred potency. 
In the Physics, Aristotle defines place as “the boundary of the con-
taining body at which it is in contact with the containing body”, or 
as “that which is bounded by a surface”. In this definition place can 
be understood as a qualitative space that belongs to each and every 
individual as the inner limit that distinguishes its individuality.  
The individual is defined as place by being boundary to something 
else, as well as by being in a particular order composed by each 
thing’s multiple surfaces. In this sense, location here equalled to 
identification, is characterised by being both countable as differenti-
ated only by a boundary, and qualitative, since it could come in no 
other order (if it did it would no longer be bound by the same 
surfaces and, hence, be something different). It can also be noted 
that in the Physics, time plays a crucial role when speaking of 
location, as the time-concept that Aristotle proposes is derived from 
that of space; time is exemplified and discussed as change.31 
The figure of the temple in the quotation above seems to imply 
then, that Zambrano developed a space-time concept heavily 
dependent on Aristotle. To her understanding, space-time should be 
conceived of as a change in substance, which by her interpretation 
was to be equalled to the change of place by which things became 
individualised as inner limit. In addition, the quotation suggests 
that it is the sacred that is to be understood as that originary realm 
from which individualised forms — such as the temple — come 
into being. This gives some account of things that are created by 
man, but at the outset Zambrano was quoted stating that her 
intention was to use the entire physics of Aristotle and place it in the 
human being. For this we have to turn to Zambrano’s late writings. 
Aristotle in Claros del Bosque
The author returns to the concept of the soul in her late book Claros 
del Bosque. And even though she criticised Aristotelian concepts in 
El hombre y lo divino, there are good reasons to believe that it is at 
least partially indebted to the same notion in his works. As has been 
indicated in the earlier book, Zambrano speaks of a Pythagorean 
soul opposed to Aristotelian logic. She describes it as an entity that 
travels the universe freely. On its journey the soul is in fact only 
directed by two things, on the one hand the longing for its origin, 
and on the other hand towards the earthly hell.32 In this sense the 
soul is a figure of human agency, moving between (or towards) 
origin and formed being. The soul can for this reason be understood 
as one of the most important figures in Zambrano’s thinking, that 
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works as the tool by which the human being moves between poten-
cy and actualization. The question is what gives the soul this capaci-
ty? It is here that Aristotle comes into play. 
Zambrano’s description of the temple, as well as her notion of sentir 
originario, indicates that the originary realm that she equalled with 
potency could also be found in the human being. As mentioned 
above, the primary sensing is a kind of passive pre-condition of 
experience. In Zambrano’s Claros del Bosque, the soul is described as 
an espacio interior — “inner room” — and directly connected to  
the heart.33 Zambrano furthermore compares the human heart to the 
Aristotelian un-moved mover and uses a poetic description of its 
bodily functioning to describe how the heart works to organize bo dily 
composition.34 Whereas the soul is free to move in the universe, the 
heart is the bodily agent that maintains the unity of a living body. 
Zambrano is describing what could be understood as two pools of 
human agency; on the one hand the passive activity of a heart that 
with its rhythmic flow maintains the unity of the body, and on the 
other hand the active soul that moves freely in the universe. And as 
she suggests, these two kinds of agency are closely connected, 
something that can be seen in the changes in beating of the heart 
when humans feel joy, disgust or desire. The two kinds of human 
agency distinguished by Zambrano bear close resemblance to the 
two kinds of soul that Aristotle distinguishes in De Anima III: 5, 
430a14-15. In this passage Aristotle distinguishes between a passive 
part of the soul in which thinking is like being affected by some-
thing “by becoming all things”, as he writes. The other part of the 
soul is active insofar as it is not impressed by other things, but 
creates them. “By virtue of making all things”, writes Aristotle. 
There are different opinions on how to interpret this passage in 
Aristotle. Some understand the active soul to be interior to the 
human being while others have interpreted it to be exterior and 
resembling of a divine mind.35 In Zambrano, however, both soul  
and heart are functions necessary to explain how the human being 
can move from potentiality to actualized expression. In De Anima 
III:10, 433a 17-19 and 20-21 this is at least partially explained by the 
concepts of desire and imagination, where desire of an object is said 
to be the causes of locomotion. In Zambrano, it seems, it is the 
double functioning of heart and soul that produces a human being 
with the faculty to perceive (i.e. receive) and to create by expressing. 
But, in El hombre y lo divino, Zambrano also introduces a concept of 
love to explain what effectuates the motion between human potency 
and actuality. 
Y, llevados por el amor los hombres recorrerán ese largo camino cuyo 
logro es la propia unidad, el llegar a ser de verdad uno mismo.36 
Like the concept of desire in Aristotle’s De Anima, Zambrano 
suggests that love as an emotion is what in reality causes motion. In 
her account it does not primarily cause locomotion (i.e. changes of 
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place) but motion in the sense of becoming oneself, i.e. actualiza-
tion. However, and as we have seen above, since for Zambrano 
individuality is closely connected to the notion of place in Aristotle’s 
Physics, it is quite plausible that in fact actualization means to come 
into a certain place, and, thus, individuality. Because, according to 
Zambrano, what every being desires more than anything else is its 
own identity.37 
Concluding discussion
It can be concluded that Zambrano drew heavily on Aristotelian 
concept when elaborating on what she conceived to be a new notion 
of subjectivity. Even though there were, among other things, parts of 
the Aristotelian conception of substance that she criticised, other 
concepts such as time, place, soul and desire could be found either 
between Zambrano’s own concepts or in the poetic structures with 
which she describes the human being. In addition, it can be con-
cluded that it was not only the Metaphysics, but also the Physics and 
De Anima that Zambrano used to develop her own thinking. This is 
particularly prominent in her book El hombre y lo divino. 
Nothing has been said in this article about the sources on which 
Zambrano based her Aristotle interpretation. It is known that she 
read Greek, and it is probable that she read the original sources 
directly. But we also know, from Zambrano herself, among others, 
that the course on Aristotle that her teacher Xavier Zubiri held in 
1931 in Madrid was transformational for her understanding of 
philosophy. Zubiri’s book on Aristotle, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, 
was also one of few books that Zambrano cited with page num-
bers.38 This would indicate that, as opposed to many other works 
that she is known to have cited out of memory, she had his book 
beside her when writing El hombre y lo divino. Zubiri’s course was in 
turn influenced by the visit he had made to Germany in the previ-
ous two years. During his visit he had attended Heidegger’s classes 
in Freiburg, among other things, as well as the physics seminar of 
Albert Einstein’s in Berlin. His interest in Aristotle was visibly 
tainted by Heidegger’s interpretation of the same author and in his 
previously mentioned book, he synthetizes Aristotle, quantum 
physics and Paulinian theology. It is a matter for future research to 
investigate in what way Zambrano’s interpretation of Aristotle 
concurs and differs from Zubiri’s and Heidegger’s. 
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